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Abstract
This is a theoretical and empirical paper to analyze possible bias against daughters in the
provision of healthcare. Women once married become part of in-laws’ families, leading to
certain inter-family externalities in household decision making, which in turn result in gender
bias in healthcare. We test our theoretical predictions using LSMS household survey data
from two Indian states, viz. Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. We find strong evidence for the
existence of bias against daughters. We also find, consistent with our theory but contrary to
conventional wisdom, that the bias is more pronounced among Hindu families (who tend to
practice exogamy) than among Muslim families (who very commonly intermarry)
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1 Introduction
The primary objective of this paper is to understand a source of gender inequality in South
Asia, viz., differential access to healthcare for children. Gender bias in health can be found
at multiple levels and in multiple aspects, and it may arise due to reasons not necessarily
directly related to health (Okojie, 1994). This bias can have devastating consequences in
the developing world where functional and affordable public or private health care system is
non-existent.
In the literature there have been numerous attempts to quantify the consequence of
gender bias against women. A common approach has been to look at figures for female-to-
male ratios in population. In most countries the ratio is close to, or even a little higher than,
unity. In most South Asian countries however it is significantly less than unity: 0.934 in
China, 0.926 in India and 0.901 in Pakistan, for example. Sen (1992, 2003) concluded that
this was due to a higher mortality among women because of discrimination against them in
health and nutrition.1 He coined the phrase “missing women” to explain this phenomenon.2
He claimed that there were over 100 million missing women in Asia.3
There are of course many reasons why there may be discrimination against women
in health and nutrition and many alternative explanations can be found in the literature.
It ranges from differences in women’s childbearing roles, sex-preference of children, lack of
autonomy for women, early marriage (Okojie, 1994) to religious preferences, regional factors
and civil freedom (Dollar and Gatti, 1999); from denial by governments and communities
to excessive female mortality (Croll, 2001) to differences in bargaining power within the
household (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2000; Basu, 2005); from intra-household allocation of
1In the popular medium, one also hears of selective abortion and female infanticide as possible reasons.
2To be precise, missing women are the extra women population that would be here today but for dis-
crimination.
3Klasen (1994) estimated this number to be 89 million; Coale (1991)’s estimate is 60 million. Klasen and
Wink (2002) examined whether this number changed since the past decade, and found that the combined
estimate of missing women has increased in absolute terms though it has fallen proportionally to total
population.
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nutrients (Bardhan, 1974; Boserup, 1980; Behrman, 1988) due to son preference or due to
parental response to different labor market outcomes (Dre`ze and Sen, 1991) to differences in
investment in boys and girls to dowry related deaths (Johnson, 1996; Prasad, 1996).
In a recent paper, Oster (2005) interestingly finds that many of the missing women
are not really missing, but were not born at all. In other words, there are differences in
female-to-male ratio at birth. She finds that carriers of hepatitis B virus are more likely to
give birth to boys than girls. Remarkably, she concluded that this factor can explain 75%
of missing women in China, but a much smaller proportion (less than 20%) in India and
Pakistan.4 Thus, still a large proportion of the missing women in India can potentially be
explained by discrimination in health and nutrition.
While many factors, as mentioned above, have been used to explain various aspects
of gender bias, most apply to adults. Relatively fewer attempts have been made to explain
the gender bias among children. Parents’ decisions regarding intra-household allocation of
resources may have a direct impact on the health and well-being of children, and the decisions
can involve children’s education, child labor, or health and treatment of their sick children.
Poor health during childhood may have life long consequences.
In this paper our focus is the impact of intra-household decision making by parents
regarding children’s healthcare. We develop a theoretical model to provide possible expla-
nations of why a parent may choose to discriminate against daughters, and then test the
predictions of the model using LSMS micro data from two Indian states: Uttar Pradesh
(UP) and Bihar.
Family decisions on healthcare may be influenced by certain socio-cultural practices
prevalent in India. One such practice is that of the extended family system. According to
this system, once daughters are married, they leave the parents’ house and live with their in-
laws. Any income of the daughter after marriage becomes a property of the in-law’s family.
4Her estimates bring down the total number of missing women in Asia to 32 miilion.
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Sons continue to live with parents after getting married and the income of a son and his
wife becomes part of the income of the parents’ family. Moreover, among Hindu families
in the northern states of India exogamy is widely practiced. In such situations, parents of
brides and grooms were more often than not unknown to each other when those brides and
grooms were younger. These parents therefore are unlikely to co-ordinate among themselves
and take the future incomes of daughters-in-law into consideration when making decisions
on intra-family distribution of resources. Using this failure of parents to internalize the inter-
household externality of their potential daughters-in-law’s education and income potential,
we show that there would be gender bias in terms of how many children receive medical care
within a family. Additionally we show that as the cost of medical care rises, the bias against
girls gets worse and the bias works insofar as it interacts with health care costs.
The layout of the paper is as follows. The following section develops the theoretical
framework and a number of testable hypotheses. In section 3 we test the hypotheses using
LSMS data from two northern provinces in India. We use two econometric techniques:
Ordinary Least Squares and bivariate Logit regressions. These two are discussed respectively
in subsections 3.2 and 3.3. In subsection 3.4 we extend our analysis to examine whether there
is any religion-specific difference in family behavior with respect to gender-specific health-
care provision. Finally, some concluding remarks are made in section 4.
2 The formal framework
We consider a society in which there are a number of household each with Nm number of
boys and Nf numbers of girls to start with. There are two time periods. In period 1 all the
children go to school and enjoy leisure. However, during this period a proportion of these
children become ill. The proportion of boys and girls getting ill are denoted by im and if
respectively. These proportions are known to the families. However, some of the illnesses
are severe and some are not, and the families face some uncertainty about which of the sick
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children are severely ill and which are not. We assume that the total number of severely sick
boys and girls — denoted by Xm for boys and Xf for girls — follow a binomial distribution
with the probability that a child is severely sick denoted by p, and that Xm and Xf are
independently distributed. We also assume that a family that cannot identify a severely sick
child, takes tm proportion of sick male children and tf proportion of sick female children,
chosen at random, to healthcare specialists and this costs the family the amount c per child.
These two variables are chosen optimally by the family, and this optimality problem will be
considered later on. Thus, tmXm of the severely sick boys and tfXf severely sick girls receive
treatment. A proportion δ, representing the quality of healthcare, of these children do not
survive. All the severely sick children who do not receive treatment — (1− tm)Xm boys and
(1− tf )Xf girls — also die. Total number of boys and girls that die — denoted by Dm and
Df respectively — are therefore given by
Dm = δtmXm + (1− tm)Xm, (1)
Df = δtfXf + (1− tf )Xf . (2)
The children who do not die work in the second period and earn an income — wm for each
boy and wf for each girl.
Marriage plays an important role in our analysis. We assume that the surviving young
men and women get married at the beginning of period 2 to people from outside the family.
The daughters leave home to live with their in-laws and the daughters-in-law move in with
the husbands’ families. However, as you will see later on, the number of surviving boys will
outnumber the surviving girls and therefore some of the boys will remain unmarried in the
second period. Since for the daughters-in-law, investment in healthcare is made by other
families, a family has no control over how many daughters-in-law there are. For expositional
simplicity, we shall assume that there are only two families in the society, and mark the
variables for the other family with an asterisk as a superscript. Since there are only Nf −D∗f
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number of surviving girls in the other family, (N −Dm)− (Nf −D∗f ) number of boys in the
family we focus on will not get married.
Total family income net of healthcare costs in terms of period 2 prices, y, is given by
y = wm[Nm −Dm] + wf [Nf −D∗f ]− (1 + r)c[tmimNm + tf ifNf ]. (3)
The first term on the right hand side of (3) is the income of surviving sons, the second
term is by daughters-in-law, and the third term is healthcare costs. Since healthcare costs
are incurred in period 1, they are multiplied by the interest factor 1 + r.
Apart from utility from income, the families also suffer disutility from the death of
children. In order to keep the analysis tractable, we assume a very simple rule for converting
disutility from bereavement into monetary values, and write the net utility of the family, u,
as
u = U(y − φ(Dm +Df )), (4)
where U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, and φ is a constant parameter representing marginal disutility from
bereavement.
We turn now to the treatment of uncertainty. We utilize the concept of certainty
equivalence using the Markowitz’s model of mean-variance analysis of portfolio selection.
The certainty equivalence of the family’s utility uc is written as5
uc = E(y − φ(Dm +Df ))− γV ar(y − φ(Dm +Df )), (5)
where γ is the measure of relative risk preference. We assume that the economic agents are
risk averse, so that γ > 0.6
5See, for example, Newbery and Stiglitz (1981, ch.6) for a discussion on this concept.
6As has been shown in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), the formulation given in (5) does not need any
approximation if the utility function is of a particular type and the random variable follows a Normal
distribution. However, they have also shown that this formulation provides a good approximation with any
utility function or distribution provided the variance of the random variable is small. We have chosen a
Binomial distribution as it seems natural for the problem at hand. However, as it is know from the Central
Limit Theorem that a binomial distribution is asymptotically Normal.
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Since the number of severely sick boys and girls — Xm and Xf — are assumed to
follow a binomial distribution, we have
E(Xm) = Nmimp, (6)
E(Xf ) = Nf ifp, (7)
V ar(Xm) = Nmimp(1− p), (8)
V ar(Xf ) = Nf ifp(1− p). (9)
Using (1), (2) and (3), we write
y − φ(Dm +Df ) = (wmNm + wfNf )− (wm + φ)(δtm + 1− tm)Xm
−[wf (δt∗f + 1− t∗f ) + φ(δtf + 1− tf )]Xf
−(1 + r)c[tmimNm + tf ifNf ], (10)
and therefore
E(y − φ(Dm +Df )) = (wmNm + wfNf )− (wm + φ)(δtm + 1− tm)Nmimp
−[wf (δt∗f + 1− t∗f ) + φ(δtf + 1− tf )]Nf ifp (11)
−(1 + r)c[tmimNm + tf ifNf ],
V ar(y − φ(Dm +Df )) = (wm + φ)2(δtm + 1− tm)2Nmimp(1− p)
+[wf (δt
∗
f + 1− t∗f ) + φ(δtf + 1− tf )]2Nf ifp(1− p). (12)
Substituting (11) and (12) into (5) and then taking partial derivatives of the resulting
equation we obtain the first order conditions for tm and tf as
∂uc
∂tm
= (wm + φ)Nmimp(1− δ)− (1 + r)cNmim
+2(1− δ)γNmimp(1− p)(wm + φ)2(δtm + 1− tm) = 0,
∂uc
∂tf
= φNf ifp(1− δ)− (1 + r)cNf if
+2(1− δ)γNf ifp(1− p)φ(wf + φ)(δtf + 1− tf ) = 0,
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which can be simplified as
p[(wm + φ) + 2γ(1− p)(wm + φ)2(δtm + 1− tm)] = (1 + r)c
1− δ , (13)
p[φ+ 2γ(1− p)φ(wf + φ)(δtf + 1− tf )] = (1 + r)c
1− δ . (14)
The right hand side of the above two equations are the marginal costs of child getting
medical care (corrected for the quality of medical care). These costs are the same for boys
and girls. The left hand side of the two equations are the marginal benefits. The second
terms in the two equations arise via changes in the variance of income. The first terms
differ between the two equations in a very substantive way. In (13), the first term represents
two benefits. If a son does not die, then the family receives an income (wm) and does not
suffer disutility of bereavement (φ). However, in (14), which is the first order condition
for daughters, the benefit from wage income is absent as the daughters become part of the
in laws’ families in period 2 and the income of daughters-in-law are taken as given in the
optimization problem of the families.
From (13) and (14) the closed-form solutions the optimum levels of tm and tf are
found as
tom =
p(wm + φ) + 2γp(1− p)(wm + φ)2 − β
2γp(1− p)(wm + φ)2(1− δ) , (15)
tof =
pφ+ 2γp(1− p)φ(wf + φ)− β
2γp(1− p)φ(wf + φ)(1− δ) , (16)
tom
tof
=
{p(wm + φ) + 2γp(1− p)(wm + φ)2 − β}(wf + φ)
{pφ+ 2γp(1− p)φ(wf + φ)− β}(wm + φ)2 , (17)
where
β =
(1 + r)c
1− δ .
From (15) and (16) the following two propositions follow
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Proposition 1 Ceteris paribus, a larger proportion of sick boys than girls receive medical
treatment.
Intuition behind proposition 1 follows from the discussions after (14). Since parents
do not internalize the externality of daughters-in-law’s income potential, changes in family
income coming from the daughters-in-law do not appear in the first order condition associated
with daughters. In other words, the marginal benefit of providing medical care is higher for
sons than for daughters. The marginal costs, as mentioned before, are the same. Thus
a larger proportion of sons get medical care than daughters. This bias would not have
occurred if all the families coordinated their actions and took more of their sick daughters to
hospitals/doctors with the understanding the parents of the future daughters-in law would
be doing the same.
We now examine how changes in some of the parameters affect bias against girls in the
provision of health care. In particular, we shall examine the effects of a change in either the
cost of healthcare (c), the discount rate (r), or the quality of healthcare (δ) on the relative
attention the sons and daughters receive, given by the ratio of dtom and dt
o
f . From (17), it is
clear that an increase in either of these three parameters can be represented by an increase
in the parameter β.
Differentiating (15) and (16), and since 1 − δ in the denominators of (15) and (16)
disappear when take the ratio of tom and t
o
f , treating this term as constant, we get
2γp(1− p)(1− δ) · dt
o
m
dβ
= − 1
(wm + φ)2
< 0, (18)
2γp(1− p)(1− δ) · dt
o
f
dβ
= − 1
φ(wf + φ)
< 0. (19)
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From (15), (16), (18) and (19) we obtain
d(tom/t
o
f )
dβ
∣∣∣∣
wm=wf
=
tom
tof
[
dtom
dβ
· 1
tom
− dt
o
f
dβ
· 1
tof
]
=
wm
pφ(wm + φ)[1 + 2γ(1− p)(wm + φ)] > 0. (20)
Formally,
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, an increase in the unit cost of medical care (c) or the in-
terest rate (r) increases the bias against girls in the provision of healthcare.
The above result can be explained with the help of a diagram. In figure 1, the line c¯c¯
is the marginal cost of healthcare which same for both sons and daughters (the right hand
sides of (13) and (14)). AA and BA are respectively the marginal benefit curve for sons and
daughters. Note that AA is steeper than BA and they intersect the horizontal axis at the
same point (A). The initial equilibrium values of the treatment rates for sons and daughters
are given by tom and t
o
f respectively, and it is clear that t
o
m > t
o
f . An increase in either c or r
shifts the marginal cost line upwards to c¯∗c¯∗, and the resulting new equilibrium for the two
variables are t∗m and t
∗
f . It should be clear from the diagram that the bias is more in the new
equilibrium than in the initial one in the sense that the difference between the two variables
is higher in the new equilibrium than in the old one, i.e., t∗m − t∗f > tom − tof .7
Figure 1 here
From (15), (16) and the above discussion, it should be clear that there would be
no discrimination if wm = wf and c = β = 0, i.e., health-care cost is zero and there is
no discrimination in the labor market. The reason for this is that parents do not have to
incur any cost for taking their daughters to health-care facilities and can potentially suffer
7Since tom > t
∗
m, it is also true that t
o
f/t
o
m > t
∗
f/t
∗
m.
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disutility if the daughter dies because of lack of health care. An implication of this result is
that discrimination will only occur insofar as it interacts with health-care cost. In the next
section we shall test this hypothesis and the ones in proposition 2 using micro data from
India.
3 Empirical Estimation
In this section, we empirically test the theoretical predictions of the model presented above.
For this purpose we utilize a dataset from the World Bank’s household and community
surveys modeled after the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) surveys and test
if there is a bias against daughters in health-care provision and how this bias interacts
with health-care costs.8 The econometric methodologies we use are Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) and bivariate Logit analysis. This section is divided in three subsections. In the first
subsection the dataset is discussed. Then subsections 3.2 and 3.3 discuss results from OLS
and Logit regressions. Finally, in section 3.4 we examine if discrimination against daughters
is more among Muslim families than among Hindu families.
3.1 The Data
The data was collected by the World Bank from a two-part study of rural poverty carried
out in 1997-98 in south and eastern Uttar Pradesh and north and central Bihar. The study
utilized both qualitative methods such as rapid rural appraisal (RRA), participatory ru-
ral appraisal (PRA) methodologies, and semi-structured interviews as well as quantitative
methods drawing upon the data collected. The available data are from the quantitative
component of the study. The data was collected through household and village level ques-
tionnaires in 120 villages from a sample of 25 districts in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. A total
of 2,250 households were interviewed covering over 13,000 individual interviews. For the
8The source of the dataset is the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar Survey of Living Conditions. This dataset can
be downloaded from the World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/guide/select.html.
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purpose of this paper we utilize some information on the socio-economic characteristics of
households, some information at the village level, and, most importantly, health information
on individual children within each household. The health information utilized here include
illnesses of individual children within a family such as the quality of care that the sick chil-
dren received, the cost of treating each sick child, and the type of illness being treated. Illness
data is quite detailed and comes in eleven different categories - from relatively less severe
illnesses such as injury, fever,9 diarrhea and cataract or problems with eye sight to mental
illness, respiratory problems, tuberculosis, blood pressure, heart problems and permanent
disability. The quality of care or the type of treatment also has several categories - from faith
healer and quack to village nurse, government doctor and private doctor. For simplicity, all
the non-traditional forms of medical care have been given a score of 0 and the traditional
ones have been scored in ascending order of importance.10 Data on health expenditure or
the cost of healthcare is the amount spent by a family for a particular child over the time
period of a year.
The final sample consists only of unmarried children and grandchildren who have
suffered some kind of illness in the year prior to the survey. All adults and servants have
been eliminated. The most common illness reported was fever followed by diarrhea. About
42% of the children reported fever and about 16% reported diarrhea. In terms of the types
of treatment or quality of care received by the sick children, about 40% received traditional
treatment while 60% were taken for some method of non-traditional treatment. That is, 60%
of the sick children were treated by a quack, an indigenous practitioner, a village chemist,
or a faith healer. Among all different types of treatment quacks were the most sought after.
About 48% of sick children were taken to quacks to receive treatment. In terms of the
incidence and distribution of illness, out of 1,993 families with sick children, on average each
family had about 3 sick girls and about 4 sick boys, but only 0.6 girls and 0.9 boys received
9Fever is considered severe if it has aﬄicted the patient for over a month.
10All government doctors have been classified under one category though the original data had three
different categories of government doctors based on where the doctor was practicing medicine.
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traditional treatment. The average amount spent on traditional healthcare per person was
around 128 Rupees with total average household spending on medical care being about 860
Rupees.
In terms of the variables used for household characteristics, we have used household
head or father’s age, mother’s age, father’s and mother’s education, caste, the type of home
structure, and the number of people that live in the household. Additionally, we have also
tried to isolate whether gender bias was more prevalent in the poorer state of Bihar compared
to Uttar Pradesh. On average, the age of a household head or father was 47 years, the average
mother’s age was 42 and the average child’s age (includes children and/or grandchildren) was
8.8 years. For the sample as a whole, about 50% of all household heads were illiterate, about
80% of mothers were illiterate and about 43% of the children were illiterate. The average
education level of the household head was between being literate with no formal schooling
to less than primary education. Mothers’ average education was somewhere between being
totally illiterate to being literate with no formal schooling. For the children, the average
education was the same as the household head except it was skewed toward being literate
with no formal schooling rather than toward less than primary education.
Tables 1 and 2 here
Caste is broken down by religion in this sample. The two religions are Hindus and
Muslims with Muslims making up 11% of the population. The Muslim’s have two castes,11
an upper and one backward caste while the Hindus have 5 castes with the lowest being the
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes who were traditionally known to be the untouchables.
The largest concentration of people was in the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes account-
ing for about 26% of the total population. The average household size in this sample was
a little over 8 people in each household. In the final sample there are close to 2000 house-
holds and a little over 13,000 sick children and grandchildren. Only 1200 children, including
11Although Islam officially has no caste, but de facto the caste system is practiced by all groups of Indians.
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grandchildren, were not ill in the year preceding the survey. In the absence of any wealth
data and poorly reported income data, the type of home structure was used as a proxy for
family wealth. These also show a lot of variation across the sample. The home structures
are classified under 5 categories ranging from a thatched and completely temporary struc-
ture to a permanent and stable structure. The average structure/dwelling for this sample
ranged between a semi-permanent and semi-temporary structure. The largest concentration
of people is found in the group that lives in katcha/tile housing which falls short of being
semi-temporary and just above the poorest group with completely temporary structures.
Thus, while the wealth varied across the sample, on average, the people participating in the
survey were quite poor.
We also use a variable that represents village-level characteristics. The survey asked
how far one would have to travel to receive treatment for five different types of treatment: (i)
complicated surgery, (ii) injections, (iii) minor surgery (iv) treatment of broken bones, and
(v) treatment of TB. We created a variable called ‘distance’ which is the average distance
over the five types. The mean value of this variable is 14.2 km for Bihar and 20.6 km for
UP (see Table 1 and 2 above).
3.2 Ordinary Least Squares
We now turn to econometric analysis. As we mentioned before, we shall both OLS and Logit
regressions. In this section we consider OLS; Logit will be taken up in section 3.3.
In this subsection the dependent variable is the quality of care or treatment type
(treattype).12 As explained earlier and in the Appendix, treattype is determined using a
scoring system. The scoring system indicates that the higher the score the better the quality
of care. The dependent variable is not a gender specific variable, and we account for the
gender bias through some of the explanatory variables described below.
12All the variables used in our regression analysis are described in the Appendix.
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In our estimation we have used a number of control variables and those will be dis-
cussed a little later. But, the two most central variables are a male dummy — a dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the child is male, and 0 otherwise — and a child-specific
health-care cost variable (healthcost). These two variables help in tracking gender bias, if
any, and in testing the hypotheses that we developed earlier. As we noted in our theoretical
section, in the absence of any health-care cost, there will be no bias against girls. Our the-
ory also predicts that bias, if any, would work only via an interaction with health-care cost.
Thus, to test the hypothesis that there is no bias we introduce an interaction term, mhcost,
which is a product of the male dummy and healthcost.
We have run a number of OLS regressions based on variants of the following equation:
treattype = β0 + β1 healthcost + β2 mhcost + β3 mhcostbh + β4 male
β5 illtype + β6 hhsize + β7 headedu + β8 medu + β9 headage
+β10 mage + β11 hometype + β12 caste + β13 Hindu + β14 distance,
where some of the variables have already been discussed. Additionally, hhsize refers to the
number of people in each family, headedu is the education level of the household head or
father, medu is the education level of the mother, headage is the age of the household head,
illtype is a score variable representing the severity of illness of a child, mage is the age of
the mother,13 hometype refers to the kind of structure that the family lives in, caste refers
to which caste the family belongs to, Hindu is dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the child belongs to a Hindu family,14 distance (which is a village-level characteristics) is the
average distance of the village from a medical facility, and mhcostbh is a product of male,
healthcost and Bihar, the latter being a dummy variable representing households that reside
in the state of Bihar.
13there are 2166 male headed households and 87 female headed households. However when we created the
headedu and headage variables we considered the education and age of the head and where we say medu
and mage we considered the education and age of the spouse of the head. Thus, in a very few cases, the
medu and mage variables actually related to the spouse of the female head.
14In our sample, 93% of the families are Hindus in UP, 86% in Bihar. The overall percentage of Hindu
families is 90.
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The results are presented in Table 3. Inter-firm heteroskedasticity is taken into ac-
count in the estimations.
Table 3 here
The OLS results give strong support to the theory presented in this paper. We see that
the coefficient of male dummy is consistently positive, but insignificant. In these equations
the coefficient of the healthcost is consistently negative and significant implying that an
increase in the cost of care reduces the quality of care a child – boy or girl – receives. More
importantly, we also find that the coefficient of the interaction variable mhcost is positive
and highly significant in all the regressions. This result is found to be robust to changes in
model specification. This has two implications. First, there is a bias against girls in health-
care provision as long as health-care cost is positive. Second, the degree of bias increases as
health-care cost increases. This supports proposition 2. Finally, on the interaction terms,
the coefficient for mhcostbh is significant and positive (though only at 90% confidence level)
implying that, as long as health-care cost is positive, the extent of bias is higher in Bihar
than in UP.
All the control variables also have the expected signs. Illtype is positive and significant
implying that the more serious the illness is better the is the type of treatment the child
receives.15 Hometype, which controls for the level of wealth/income for a family, has a
positive and often significant impact, as one would expect.16 Father’s and mother’s level
of education have significant positive effects on the quality of healthcare a child receives.
Father’s age has a significant positive impact while household size and mother’s age have
negative impact on the quality of health care. In other words, younger mothers seem to be
wiser than the older ones. The caste variable is also positive and significant implying that
15We have tried alternative scoring system for illtype, giving the category “other” (see Table I in the
Appendix), a score 5. Since none of the results changed qualitatively, they are not reported here.
16As an alternative, we have also tried landholding as a control for wealth/income. Since the results are
very similar qualitatively, they are not reported here.
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the higher the caste of the sick child the more likely that the child receives a better quality
healthcare. Finally, the Hindu dummy has a negative and significant effect implying that
a Hindu family, on an average, goes to a less qualified medical professional than a Muslim
family after controlling for a whole gamut of economic and socio-economic factors. We did
not have any prior expectation on this effect.
3.3 Bivariate Logit
Although the OLS regression results strongly support our theoretical predictions, the econo-
metric methodology, for the problem at hand, can be subject to criticisms. One reason for
such a criticism is that decisions facing the families are discrete ones, selecting from a finite
number of discrete alternatives. Another potential criticism is that our dependable variable
treattype is a score variable (see Table II in the Appendix), and there is some degree of
arbitrariness in the choice of the equi-distant scores. In this section, we shall therefore carry
out our analysis using a binomial logit estimation process. In particular, we assume that a
family chooses one of the following two options: (a) to take a sick child to a non-traditional
person such as a village quack, and (b) to take a sick child to a qualified medical professional
for treatment. The choice (a) which is given the number 0 represents the first four type
of treatment in Table II, and choice (b) is given the number 1 and represents the last four
categories.
We estimate the Binomial Logit model specified as follows.
P (y = j/x) =
exp (x′αj)
1 +
∑1
k=0 exp
(x′αk)
, (j = 0, 1).
The choice of the firm is denoted by y. As for the regressor, vector x explaining a
firm’s choice y, we use the same explanatory variables used in the OLS analysis.
The estimation results from the binomial response model are reported in Table 4. Like
in OLS regressions, inter-firm heteroskedasticity is taken into account in the estimations. As
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the response probability of the choice j relative to the base category (choice (a)) is given
by pj/p0 = exp(x
′αj), the significantly positive estimate mhcost indicates that parents are
more likely to take their sons for better types of treatment than their daughters. In general
all the coefficients are qualitatively the same – both in terms of their signs and significance
levels – as in the OLS regressions.17 Therefore, the robustness of our results carries through
to the present case of binomial Logit analysis.
Table 4 here
3.4 Do Muslims discriminate more than Hindus?
Since our sample represents two distinct religious groups, viz., Hindus and Muslims, with
the latter forming a significant minority: 11% of the observations, one may be tempted to
ask if there is any difference in the behavior of the two groups with regard to their daughters
vis-a`-vis their sons. It is possibly not wrong to say that the conventional wisdom — at least
outside the Islamic World — is that bias against women is more pronounced among Muslims
than among other religious groups. In this subsection, we look into this question.
Before turning to the empirical questions, we should note that our theoretical model
would predict a lower bias among Muslim families than among the Hindu ones. This is
because, in our theoretical model, the presence of inter-family externality in family decision-
making process leads to bias against daughters insofar as health-care provision is concerned.
This externality would be internalized if different families coordinate their actions. Since
whereas Hindus in Northern India tend to practice exogamy in marriages, intermarrying is
very common among Muslim, one would expect more coordination among Muslim families
than among Hindu ones. This should lead to less bias among Muslims and Hindus.
Returning to the empirical issues, an obvious approach for testing the existence of
possible differential bias among the two religious groups would have been to include another
17The only exception is the coefficient for the Bihar dummy (mhcostbh) which is insignificant here.
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variable which is the product of three variables healthcost, male dummy and Hindu dummy,
and look at the sign of its coefficient. A significant negative value of this coefficient would
have confirmed the conventional wisdom. Unfortunately, however, we were unable to do so
as this variable and mhcost (which is the product of only the first two of the three variables)
are highly correlated with the correlation coefficient being 0.94.
As a first step in our analysis in this regard, given that we cannot use the dummy-
variable technique, we computed female-to-male ratios for the two groups separately and
find, surprisingly, that the ratio is 0.88 for Hindus and 0.93 for Muslims. We therefore find
prima facie evidence that the conventional wisdom may not be true after all.
The next step in our analysis is to divide the total sample in to two subsamples, one
consisting observations on Hindus only and the other Muslims, and then run the regressions
separately for the two groups. We have run both OLS and Logit regressions as in the
preivious subsections, and all the specifications therein. However, since all the results are
very similar, for the sake of brevity in Table 5 we only present a selection of estimations:
Logits regressions corresponding to columns (5)-(8) in Table 4.
As can be seen from Table 5, the results are very similar to those in Tables 3 and
4, with one important difference.18 The coefficient for mhcost is statistically significant
(at 99% confidence level) for Hindus, but insignificant (even with 75% confidence level) for
Muslims. This implies that the evidence is is in sharp contrast to conventional wisdom: there
is bias against daughters among Hindu families, but there is not enough evidence to suggest
that Muslim families discriminate against their daughters insofar as health-care provision
is concerned. More interestingly, these findings are consistent with the predictions of our
theoretical analysis.
Table 5 here
18It is also interesting to note that the coefficients of household size (hhsize) are insignificant for Hindus,
but are significantly negative for Muslims. In contrast, the coefficient for healthcost is significant for Hindus
and significantly negative for Muslims.
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4 Conclusion
Much has been written on possible bias against women and daughters and their consequences,
in Asia. There are many mechanisms via which a bias can manifest itself. One such form
could be in the provision of healthcare for sick children. In this paper, we first of all provided
a theoretical explanation for why a family may treat their sons and daughters differentially
in health-care provision, and tested our theoretical predictions with micro data from two
provinces of India.
There are two important elements to our theoretical model. The first is specific
to the nature of the problem at hand, viz., healthcare. In particular, the fact that often
parents cannot be sure about the extent of severity of an illness of a child, is important
for our analysis. The second element has to do with a particular social institution that is
prevalent in South Asia, viz., a woman, once married, becomes a part of the in-law’s family.
We show that these two aspects lead to the presence of inter-family externality in family
decision-making process and this in turn leads to bias against daughters insofar as health-
care provision is concerned. It is to be noted that the externality would be internalized
if different families coordinate their actions. However, coordination may be difficult for a
society in which exogamy is practiced in marriages. We also find that the bias exists only
in the presence of positive health-care costs, and the extent of the bias increases as costs
increase.
The data for our empirical analysis come from the World Bank’s household LSMS
surveys carried out in 1997 and 1998 in south and eastern Uttar Pradesh and north and
central Bihar. Both these states are toward the north of the country where the social
institutions fit very well with our theoretical construct. Econometric analysis using both an
Ordinary Least Squares method and a binomial Logit analysis give strong backing to our
theoretical predictions. In particular, we find strong evidence of a bias against daughters in
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health-care provision. Additionally, the empirical results show that gender bias gets worse
as the cost of care increases. Finally, we find that whereas the bias is significant among
Hindu families who tend to practice exogamy, there is not enough evidence to suggest that
bias exists among Muslim families who often intermarry.
One of the policy implications of our analysis is that it is not only important that the
quality of healthcare improves, but it is also very important that while such improvements
take place governments should make sure that costs of quality health-care provision to poorer
sections of the population is kept as low as possible.
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Figure 1: The Discrimination Equilibrium
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Table 1: Summary statistics for UP
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
illtype 4662 3.512227 2.20553 1 11
hometype 7151 2.852608 1.379705 1 5
landholding 6464 3.898864 6.774413 0 93
healthcost 7162 198.0595 1361.904 0 35000
headage 7146 49.5883 13.99864 7 95
mage 6300 43.72571 12.81158 7 90
headedu 7146 2.845788 2.343075 1 11
medu 6300 1.47746 1.431164 1 11
distance 7152 20.60733 11.35347 5.2 72.8
hhsize 7227 8.453438 4.331367 1 29
hhkids 7162 4.248255 2.362741 1 17
Table 2: Summary statistics for Bihar
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
illtype 3089 4.295565 2.533912 1 11
hometype 6154 2.155671 1.302142 1 5
landholding 4271 2.319766 3.145107 0 20
healthcost 6161 209.2282 1231.977 0 30000
headage 6161 47.11816 12.92628 3 87
mage 5694 41.85739 12.35055 0 80
headedu 6161 3.057621 2.265729 1 11
medu 5 694 1.574113 1.32098 1 8
distance 6121 14.24454 8.687809 4.4 47.7
hhsize 6202 7.57288 3.273768 1 25
hhkids 6161 3.860737 1.969677 1 15
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Table 3: OLS Regressions
Dependent Variable: Treatment Type (treattype)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Const. 1.214∗ 1.176∗ 1.022∗ 0.979∗ 1.071∗ 0.997∗ 1.322∗ 1.284∗
(17.7) (15.8) (13.1) (10.0) (11.0) (10.1) (11.2) (11.0)
Male 0.058 0.060 0.055 0.064 0.059 0.059 0.301 0.038
(1.4) (1.5) (1.3) (1.5) (1.3) (1.3) (0.7) (0.9)
Illtype 0.139∗ 0.138∗ 0.133∗ 0.139∗ 0.139∗ 0.139∗ 0.136∗ 0.136∗
(16.0) (16.0) (14.5) (14.8) (14.9) (14.8) (14.5) (14.5)
healthcost -0.156∗ -0.149∗ -0.164∗ -0.150∗ -0.165∗ -0.159∗ -0.161∗ -0.150∗
(3.2) (3.0) (2.9) ((2.9) (3.1) (3.0) (3.1) (2.9)
hometype 0.063∗ 0.058∗ 0.055∗ 0.058∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(4.1) (3.7) (3.2) (3.4) (1.9) (1.7)
mhcost 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(5.7) (5.6) (4.2) (4.8) (4.8) (4.8) (4.6) (2.5)
distance -0.020∗ -0.020∗ -0.018∗ -0.020∗ -0.019∗ -0.019∗ -0.017∗ -0.018∗
(11.2) (11.1) (9.7) (10.5) (9.8) (10.2) (9.2) (9.3)
hhsize 0.006 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 -0.012∗∗
(1.2) (0.1) (0.8) (1.4) (2.1)
headedu 0.104∗
(9.9)
medu 0.049∗
(2.9)
headage 0.020∗ 0.019∗ 0.020∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(3.4) (3.3) (3.4) (2.4) (2.4)
mage -0.016∗ -0.013∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.009 -0.011∗∗∗
(2.5) (2.2) (2.4) (1.5) (1.8)
Caste 0.529∗ 0.523∗
(9.5) (9.3)
Hindu -0.318∗ -0.309∗
(4.6) (4.5)
mhcostbh 0.0001∗∗∗
(1.6)
R¯2 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08
F-Stat. 79.9 68.3 76.1 55.2 53.2 49.4 53.4 52.3√
MSE 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.75 1.75
Obs. # 7623 7620 6787 6782 6787 6779 6779 6779
∗ Significant at 99% level of confidence
∗∗ Significant at 95% level of confidence
∗∗∗ Significant at 90% level of confidence
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Table 4: LOGIT Regressions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Const. -0.679∗ -0.735∗ -0.897∗ -0.887∗ -0.767∗ -0.870∗ -0.552∗ -0.593∗
(8.3) (8.2) (9.4) (7.6) (6.7) (7.4) (4.0) (4.3)
Male 0.049 0.052 0.046 0.061 0.055 0.056 0.028 0.031
(1.0) (1.1) (0.9) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (0.5) (0.6)
Illtype 0.147∗ 0.147∗ 0.139∗ 0.144∗ 0.143∗ 0.144∗ 0.143∗ 0.143∗
(14.1) (14.1) (12.6) (12.9) (13.0) (12.9) (12.7) (12.7)
healthcost -0.213∗ -0.202∗ -0.208∗ -0.200∗ -0.216∗ -0.208∗ -0.215∗ -0.212∗
(3.5) (3.3) (3.2) (3.1) (3.3) (3.2) (3.3) (3.2)
hometype 0.087∗ 0.080∗ 0.077∗ 0.081∗ 0.055∗ 0.051∗
(4.7) (4.3) (3.9) (4.0) (2.7) (2.5)
mhcost 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗ 0.0001∗
(3.9) (3.8) (3.3) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (3.5) (2.5)
distance -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.019∗ -0.021∗ -0.019∗ -0.020∗ -0.019∗ -0.019∗
(9.1) (9.1) (7.8) (8.4) (7.8) (8.2) (7.4) (7.4)
hhsize 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.012∗∗∗
(1.5) (0.2) (0.4) (1.1) (1.7)
headedu 0.129∗
(10.3)
medu 0.056∗
(2.7)
headage 0.024∗ 0.023∗ 0.024∗ 0.017∗ 0.017∗
(3.2) (3.2) (3.3) (2.6) (2.6)
mage -0.021∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.020∗ -0.014∗∗ -0.015∗∗
(2.6) (2.3) (2.5) (1.9) (2.1)
Caste 0.546∗ 0.539∗
(8.5) (8.4)
Hindu -0.313∗ -0.302∗
(4.0) (3.8)
mhcostbh 0.0001
(1.5)
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
Wald χ2 324.0 324.9 413.0 288.6 274.9 288.8 365.2 358.3
Obs. # 7623 7620 6787 6782 6787 6779 6779 6779
∗ Significant at 99% level of confidence
∗∗ Significant at 95% level of confidence
∗∗∗ Significant at 90% level of confidence
24
Table 5: LOGIT Regressions for Hindus and Muslims
1 1a 2 2a 3 3a 4 4a
Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim Hindu Muslim
Const. -0.716∗ -0.895∗ -0.825∗ -1.128∗ -0.780∗ -1.045∗ -0.788∗ -1.230∗
(5.9) (2.5) (6.5) (3.1) (6.1) (2.8) (6.3) (3.4)
Male 0.040 0.133 0.039 0.129 0.019 0.089 0.015 0.172
(0.7) (0.8) (0.7) (0.8) (0.4) (0.5) (0.3) (1.0)
Illtype 0.131∗ 0.240∗ 0.131∗ 0.235∗ 0.132∗ 0.245∗ 0.131∗ 0.238∗
(11.3) (4.6) (11.2) (4.5) (11.3) (4.7) (11.2) (4.9)
healthcost -0.240∗ -0.016 -0.229∗ -0.041 -0.242∗ -0.038 -0.254∗ -0.099
(3.5) (0.1) (3.3) (0.2) (3.5) (0.2) (3.6) (0.5)
hometype 0.080∗ 0.305∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.283 0.045∗∗ 0.163
(3.8) (4.4) (2.0) (3.9) (2.1) (2.7)
mhcost 0.00012∗ 0.00005 0.00012∗ 0.00006 0.00012∗ 0.00008 0.00008∗ 0.00002
(3.5) (0.9) (3.4) (1.0) (3.4) (1.2) (2.5) (0.01)
distance -0.016∗ -0.044∗ -0.017∗ -0.050∗ -0.015∗ -0.056∗ -0.014∗ -0.059∗
(6.3) (5.1) (6.8) (5.7) (5.7) (6.3) (5.6) (6.7)
hhsize 0.008 -0.074∗ 0.004 -0.098∗ -0.001 -0.088∗
(1.1) (3.8) (0.51) (5.0) (0.13) (4.4)
headage 0.022∗ 0.059∗ 0.023∗ 0.069∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.069∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.057
(2.8) (3.3) (2.8) (3.5) (2.3) (3.6) (2.4) (3.3)
mage -0.020∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.022∗ -0.047∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.052∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.047∗
(2.4) (1.7) (2.6) (2.2) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3) (2.5)
Caste 0.548∗ 0.682∗ 0.543∗ 0.794∗
(7.8) (3.9) (7.8) (4.6)
mhcostbh 0.0001 0.0001
(1.6) (0.3)
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.04 0.17
WALD χ2 201.8 90.1 212.6 97.4 262.0 257.5 116.1
Obs. # 6035 752 6027 752 6027 6027 752
∗ Significant at 99% level of confidence
∗∗ Significant at 95% level of confidence
∗∗∗ Significant at 90% level of confidence
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APPENDIX
Definition of Variables
Variable Name Definition
pdtreatment takes the value 1 if the child is taken to a traditional doctor
for treatment and 0 otherwise.
male takes the value 1 if the child is male and 0 otherwise
healthcost amount spent by a family for a particular child
over the time period of a year
illtype Score variable on type of illness (see Table I below)
treattype Score variable on the type of treatment (see Table II below)
mhcost Interaction between ‘male’ and ‘healthcost’
distance Average distance from the village to five types of
medical facilities
hometype Score variable on the quality of the house the child lives in
(see Table IV below)
hhsize total number of people in the family
headage age of father
mage age of mother
headedu Score variable on father’s education level (see Table III below)
medu Score variable on mother’s education level (see Table III below)
caste takes the value 1 if the child in high or middle-high cast,
and 0 otherwise
Bihar takes the value 1 if the child in from Bihar, and 0 otherwise
religion takes the value 1 if the child in Hindu and 0 otherwise
mcostbh Interaction between ‘male’, ‘healthcost’ and ‘Bihar’
Scoring System
Table I
Illness Type Score
Injury 1
Fever 2
diarrhea 3
cataract 4
mental 5
respiratory 6
Tuberculosis 7
blood pressure 8
heart problem 9
perm disability 10
other 11
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Table II
Treatment type Score
non-traditional:
indigenous 0
faith healer 0
quack 0
chemist 0
traditional:
charitable doctor 1
village nurse 2
government doctor 3
private doctor 4
Table III
Education Score
illiterate 1
literate but no formal schooling 2
less than primary 3
primary 4
middle 5
matriculate 6
intermediate 7
bachelor’s degree 8
masters 9
professional degree 10
diploma 11
Table IV
Home type Score
“katcha/thatch” – temp structure 1
“katcha/tile” – temp but more stable 2
“semi pucca” – relatively stable 3
“pucca w/weaker sector”
– relatively stable with weak areas 4
“pucca” – stable 5
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